The persistent political crisis in Bangladesh is often framed as a binary dilemma: is the nation suffering from a flawed political culture, or from a flawed constitution? The pragmatic answer is that these two pathologies are inextricably linked. While reforming the constitution will not, in isolation, cure the nation's political ills, it is equally true that no meaningful political recovery is possible without fundamental constitutional reform. A new political settlement (a noya rajonitik bondobosto) is inconceivable without a new constitutional framework. This essay argues against the popular academic and political tendency to treat the constitution as an "innocent" document, a mere victim of "abuse" by malign political actors. Instead, it posits that the Bangladeshi constitution, in its current form, is not a passive victim but an active enabler, a legal architecture of the very autocracy it supposes to prevent.
A more nuanced claim in academic discourse suggests that the constitution itself is sound, but that autocracy has arisen from its abuse by those in power. This concept is known as ‘abusive constitutionalism.’ This distinction, while academically tidy, is politically perilous. To absolve the constitution of culpability is to create a dangerous political narrative that no structural reform is necessary, only a change in political leadership. This view conveniently ignores the generalized and a simple claim," which is far more direct: the constitution possesses an inherent, autocratic framework. Its design rules facilitate the creation of a prime ministerial dictatorship, a system of party-based autocracy where checks and balances are systematically eroded, leaving the executive supreme. The constitutional structure is a blueprint that designs its occupant for autocratic rule.
The danger of the "innocent constitution" narrative is that it creates a legal and political impasse. If the constitution is fundamentally sound, then the recent period of autocratic governance must be legally designated as "unconstitutional." Yet, proponents of this view are conspicuously silent on this legal determination. This silence provides political cover, fostering a narrative that the system works, thereby obstructing the critical task of identifying and reforming the specific enabling provisions and design flaws that pave the way for dictatorship. As long as this view prevails, the nation will remain trapped in a cyclical debate about "abuse" and "crisis," while the structural foundations of autocracy remain untouched.
This reluctance to blame the framework may stem from a non-positivist legal tradition that instinctively views law as an innocent, neutral arbiter. This view must be challenged. A constitution is not an abstract, infallible text; it is a human-crafted political document, and it can be guilty. It can contain flaws, omissions, and ambiguities that are either accidental or, more cynically, deliberately engineered by autocratic forces to serve their own ends. As was noted by Tajuddin Ahmad in the 1972 Constituent Assembly, constitutions have limitations and cannot foresee all futures. When those limitations are exposed and exploited for decades, they cease to be theoretical weaknesses and become active components of the autocratic machinery.
Ultimately, the argument for reform must transcend a utopian faith in the character of political leaders. We cannot build a state that functions only if its leaders are virtuous, like a Justice Habibur Rahman, and which collapses if they are power-hungry. A sound constitution must be built on a more cynical, and realistic, view of human nature. It must be robust enough to constrain the worst impulses of its leaders.
If, for example, the inclusion of term limits for the prime minister would demonstrably reduce the probability of long-term autocracy, then the absence of such limits is not a neutral feature, it is a critical and culpable constitutional flaw. It is precisely because of such flaws, omissions, and structural imbalances that the Bangladeshi constitution can and must be held responsible for its role in fostering autocracy. For a people who have experienced the crushing weight of such a system, doubting the innocence of law is not cynicism; it is a political virtue. A constitution designed for an autocratic prime minister and serially abused by autocrats must be damned, alongside the political actors, as a root cause of the autocracy itself.
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